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Objectives: The aim of this study was to determine how evidence from systematic review (SR) is perceived and negotiated by expert stakeholders in considering a technology for potential
disinvestment.
Methods: An evidence-informed stakeholder engagement examined results from a diagnostic accuracy SR of vitamin B12 and folate tests. Pathologists deliberated around the SR findings to generate
an informed contribution to future policy for the funding of B12 and folate tests. Deliberations were transcribed and subject to qualitative analysis.
Results: Pathologists did not engage with findings from the SR in depth; rather they sought to contest the terms of the problem driving the review and attempted to reframe it. Pathologists questioned
the usefulness of SR outcomes given the variable definitions of B12 deficiency and deferred addressing disinvestment options specifically pertaining to B12 testing. However, folate testing was
proffered as a potential disinvestment candidate, based upon pathologists’ definition of “appropriate” evidence beyond the bounds of the SR.
Conclusions: The value of SR to informing disinvestment deliberations by expert stakeholders may be a function of timing as well as content. Engagement of stakeholders in co-produced evidence may
be required at two levels: (i) Early in the synthesis phase to help shape the SR and harmonize expert views with the available evidence (including gaps); (ii) Collaboration in primary research to fill
evidence-gaps thus supporting evidence-based disinvestment. Without this, information asymmetry between clinically engaged experts and decision makers may preclude the collaborative, informed,
and technical discussions required to generate productive policy change.
Keywords: Disinvestment, Qualitative research, Systematic review, Evidence-based practice, Health policy
Health policy making in Australia, as in other Western demo-
cratic contexts, has increasingly been characterized as a process
of evidence appraisal (12). Mirroring the developing promi-
nence of evidence-based medicine, “evidence-informed health
policy” has emerged as a dominant evaluative framework in
which decisions routinely foreground the outcomes of primary
research, systematic reviews (SR), and health technology as-
sessments (HTA).
While some practitioners critique the notion that “evidence-
based healthcare. . .can make an unproblematic transformation
into evidence-based policy” (11), a growing acknowledgement
that decision-making processes should be both explicit and pub-
lic has fuelled the evidence-based policy movement. Such con-
cerns are particularly salient with regard to healthcare “dis-
investment” – policy reform oriented to supporting safe and
effective care within sustainable health systems (7).
We thank the participants in the stakeholder engagements; without their generous contributions
this research would not have been possible. Prof Hiller and Dr Elshaug are co-chief-investigators of
The ASTUTE Health study which is funded by the National Health and Medical Research Council
(NHMRC) of Australia (project ID 565327). Additional members of The ASTUTE Health study
group are: Prof Annette Braunack-Mayer, Dr John R. Moss, Dr Heather Buchan and Dr Janet Wale.
Drs Elshaug and Willis hold NHMRC Fellowships (ID 627061 and 1013165, respectively).
In Australia, SR evidence forms the cornerstone of HTA
and related policy processes. Within a disinvestment frame-
work, understanding how SR findings fit within the rubric of
“evidence,” how they are used to inform decisions, and how
this evidence is negotiated by expert clinical stakeholders, is
integral to the establishment, evaluation, and success of reform.
Using a case study, this investigation describes an example of
evidence-informed debate around potential disinvestment pol-
icy, situated within a case study of pathology testing for vitamin
B12 and folate. More specifically, we address the role of SR in
informing such debates, and the negotiation of SR evidence by
an expert group of clinical stakeholders.
Systematic Review in a Health Policy Context
Systematic reviews have become central starting points to fram-
ing evidence-informed health investment decisions made at lo-
cal, provincial/territorial, and federal levels in several interna-
tional jurisdictions (for examples, see 1;16;19;21).
However, determining the role of SR in the context of dis-
investment decisions has been less straightforward. Early work
in the Australian context has suggested broad stakeholder sup-
port for disinvestment processes to be aligned with existing
evidence-based policy processes for investment decisions (6),
while Spanish work in this area has also emphasized the use
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of SR in disinvestment decisions (9). The United Kingdom has
focused more broadly on using guidelines as the basis for disin-
vestment recommendations (including those based on Cochrane
Collaboration SRs), while Program Budgeting and Marginal
Analysis (PBMA) approaches, among others, have been applied
in Canadian provinces and regions (9).
For new and emerging technologies and services, compre-
hensive SRs are an integral part of HTA but they alone do
not constitute an HTA. For disinvestment health policy deci-
sion making the precise role of SR requires investigation, given
certain conditions unique to disinvestment policy, including:
contention around the identification of candidate technologies;
the apparent greater “strength” of evidence required for a disin-
vestment decision; the contestability of evidence; and the role
of stakeholders in these decisions.
To inform further the pragmatic application of SR methods
to disinvestment decisions, this study addresses broad questions
around the role of SR within disinvestment policy processes.
The discussion focuses on how clinical stakeholders perceived
and negotiated SR evidence within a specific case study with
potential for disinvestment: pathology testing for vitamin B12
and folate.
METHODS
Selection of Case Study
Lead members of this research group have proposed criteria
by which to “flag” potential technologies that might warrant
further investigation under disinvestment programs (8). These
criteria include among others: geographic variations in use;
temporal variations in volume; public interest or controversy;
or nomination from clinical groups. This process was adapted
for topic selection in the current study, resulting in a wide range
of candidates being flagged. Tests for investigating vitamin
B12 and folate levels—most frequently ordered conjointly in
Australia—were nominated by clinical experts to this research
group. Further scoping revealed that they met several additional
“flag” criteria from this group’s identification and prioritization
frameworks (8); a full account of this is recorded in a separate
manuscript (Willis et al., unpublished data 2012). Briefly, since
2001, usage of a combined vitamin B12 and folate test through
Australia’s universal health insurance scheme, Medicare, has
experienced an annual average growth of 21.78 percent (15) in
contrast to 6.3 percent for all pathology services (14). Interna-
tional differences in recommended test usage are also apparent
(3;10;17;20), while usage in some clinical scenarios appears to
conflict with available clinical guidelines (2). Finally, given this
was a primary research study, it was decided by the lead inves-
tigators that these tests offered characteristics (e.g., low level
of controversy, high volume, low cost per-item) which would
balance the other case study chosen for investigation, assisted
reproductive technologies.
Systematic Review
Diagnostic accuracy (a central marker of the effectiveness of
diagnostic testing) formed the foundations of a SR on the effec-
tiveness of vitamin B12 and folate tests in determining the pres-
ence or absence of deficiencies (22). A protocol for guiding this
SR was developed in consultation with a clinical pathologist,
health services researchers, epidemiologists, health economists
and experts in HTA. The SR aimed to synthesize published
evidence relating to the diagnostic accuracy of the three most
commonly used tests for investigating vitamin B12 and folate
deficiency: serum B12, serum folate, and red cell folate assays.
Results from the SR and meta-analysis suggested that the
serum B12 assay has limited ability to identify patients with
symptoms amenable to vitamin supplementation, noting poor
positive (PLR) and negative (NLR) likelihood ratios across pa-
tient sub-groups. Similar results were found for serum folate
assays, while there was insufficient evidence available to com-
plete a similar analysis for red cell folate assays. As noted in the
review, the existing evidence base is hampered by lack of an in-
ternationally recognized “gold standard” for diagnosing either
vitamin B12 or folate deficiencies; imperfect reference standard
tests; and inconsistent “cut-off” values used to distinguish defi-
cient from nondeficient patients (22).
Stakeholder Engagement
Following completion of the SR, a series of iterative stakeholder
engagements was undertaken, involving test requesters (primary
care physicians and specialists), test providers (pathologists) and
key decision makers (federal government policy advisors). De-
tails of this engagement process are provided elsewhere (Watt
et al., unpublished data, 2012). Briefly, each group was con-
sulted separately in professionally facilitated sessions that
sought to explore reasons for the changing usage of B12/folate
tests, to discuss the evidence arising from the SR, and to deter-
mine potential avenues for reform (see Figure 1).
Nominations for participants within the test provider group
(the focus of this manuscript) were sought from key stakeholder
bodies in the field of pathology (see Table 1). Nine nominees
and key opinion leaders (pathologists) took part in the engage-
ment held in Sydney, New South Wales in May 2011; three
females and six males. During this 4-hour session, participants
were presented with the outcomes of the SR, supplemented
with information modules pertaining to relevant health funding
policy and economic considerations to support decision mak-
ing (see Figure 1). Following deliberation around this evidence,
participants were invited to discuss their experiential knowledge
and perspectives on the issue, before formulating a response to
the question “What should be considered when making deci-
sions about how much we should publicly subsidies B12/folate
pathology tests?”. After obtaining consent from participants,
deliberations were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim by
an experienced stenographer.
INTL. J. OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 28:3, 2012 212
The role of evidence in disinvestment
Community: 
Role of testing; 
expectations; value of 





potential for change 
General
Practitioners (2): 
Exploration of evidence; 










potential for change 
Phase 2:  
Stakeholder engagement 
Policy advisors (Federal) 
Phase 3: 
Policy deliberation & analysis   
Process evaluation 
Utilisation 
Examination of Medicare 
data to determine basic 
utilisation patterns 
Pathology audit 
Examination of routinely 
collected laboratory data to 







examination of advice 
provided by current clinical 
practice guidelines  
Phase 1:  
Evidence reports 
Figure 1. Evidence generation and stakeholder engagement process for vitamin B12/folate pathology testing case study.
Data Analysis
The theoretical perspective of this study is broadly social con-
structionist, our analysis grounded in the assumption that talk
reflects both the interactional context in which it is generated,
as well as broader patterns of sense making that can have both
ideological and material consequences (5).
Our focus is on how expert stakeholders (pathologists) made
sense of “evidence” within a data-informed discussion on a
disinvestment topic. In particular, we attend to participants’
framings of “what counts” as appropriate evidence for dis-
investment, the language used to justify their claims, and the
implications of these arguments for engaged policy processes
around disinvestment more broadly.
Transcripts of the stakeholder engagement followed the
model for thematic analysis as outlined by Braun and Clarke
(4). Through a process of open coding, the whole data corpus
was worked through to build up a file of instances referencing
“evidence” with regard to the case study of B12/folate testing.
The main repetitive patterns evident across these accounts were
identified and coded (axial coding). The whole corpus was then
re-read in light of these codes, and over-arching themes (con-
structed so as to emphasize internal convergence and external
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Table 1. Composition and Characteristics of Participants (Pathologists)


























a Including National Coalition of Public Pathology, Australian Association of Pathology
Practices; Australasian Association of Clinical Biochemists; Healthscope; Sonic; and
Primary Health.
divergence) were subsequently identified (4). These themes, and
representative data extracts, are outlined (in no particular order)
in Table 2, and we analyze each in turn to elaborate their im-
plications with regard to questions of evidence in disinvestment
policy.
In representing extracts of policy advisors’ talk, the tran-
scription protocol is as follows: [] indicates clarification of
meaning; . . . indicates words omitted for ease of reading; (. . .)
indicates inaudible speech.
RESULTS
Pathologists questioned the usefulness of the outcomes of the
SR presented to them at the outset of the engagement, and the
appropriateness of using systematic reviewing per se as a means
of informing funding policy around vitamin B12/folate testing.
More specifically, pathologists: (1) Contested the terms of the
problem driving the review, arguing that the B12 element of the
combined B12/folate test (but not the folate) does not represent
a legitimate candidate for disinvestment discussion. Note: that
pathologists did nominate this as a case study points to a lack of
agreement within the group (see point 2). (2) Reframed the terms
of the problem that ought to have driven the review, suggesting
that only folate testing is a suitable disinvestment focus (given
that mandatory fortification has made the identification of folate
deficiency rare), and that a clear definition of deficiency must
be established before the effectiveness of vitamin B12 testing
may be usefully investigated using SR methods.
We address each of these arguments, and their conse-
quences, in turn.
Contesting the Terms of the Problem
A central theme in the pathologists’ deliberations was that the
usage of testing for levels of vitamin B12 (as opposed to folate)
is currently appropriate, a claim that drew into question the
fundamental value of undertaking a SR in this area.
Table 2 presents a summary of participants’ arguments in
support of this position. These arguments have significant im-
plications, not only for this case study, but for the more general
role of SR within disinvestment-oriented policy processes. For
example, arguments 1–3 undermined the driving rationale of a
“review for disinvestment” in this area. Holding that B12 testing
remains imperative for a range of presentations, and that utili-
sation reflects genuine “medical issues” rather than the vested
“interest” of laboratories, pathologists rejected the notion that
this item should be subject to disinvestment discussion per se.
Although a consensually held position across the engagement,
it must be noted that this argument is at odds with the original
nomination of these B12/folate tests by other members of the
pathology community as warranting disinvestment considera-
tion.
Within a disinvestment process, participants’ rejection of a
technology as a legitimate disinvestment candidate represents a
significant barrier to productive stakeholder engagement. In this
case, a rejection of what was perceived to be the guiding prob-
lem (“B12 test utilisation is inappropriate, thus we should con-
sider disinvestment”) forestalled potential conversations with
pathologists around the effectiveness of this test as indicated
by the SR. The notion that disinvestment might represent a
more nuanced outcome than blunt rationing (to fund or not to
fund) was not entertained within the arguments outlined. For ex-
ample, pathologists’ claim that B12 testing remains imperative
for particular populations—a notion that could have supported
calls for “restrictions in eligibility” for this test to those specific
groups—served in the examples cited in Table 2 to argue in
favor of simply leaving the test alone. Stakeholder interpreta-
tions of review outcomes may be colored by “what stands to be
lost”, and a defensive stance around accountability for perceived
overuse (see argument 3) may preclude discussion around more
fine-grained disinvestment options.
Arguments 4–5 presented in Table 2 also have implications
for the use of SRs in disinvestment contexts. With regard to
the case study of B12, these claims suggested that as long as
deficiencies continue to be found, and there exists no better
available assay, we have no choice but to “use the test we have.”
These arguments served to position the outcomes of the SR
as “purely academic,” and that indications of a test’s accuracy
are useful only when alternative tests are available. In turn,
these claims precluded engagement with disinvestment con-
cerns around quality as indicated by the review (e.g., at what
point might it be wise to restrict or remove a test even in the
absence of alternatives?). At the same time, the superiority of
an alternative assay (holotranscobalamin) was asserted within
these arguments without empirical evidence of its superior accu-
racy. Each of these claims suggests the importance of explicitly
discussing issues of evidence (what counts and how to count it)
in both the framing and interpretation of SRs for disinvestment.
Argument 6, holding that any partial disinvestment/rest-
riction to pathology testing will represent additional costs,
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Table 2. Quotes Illustrating Pathologists’ Position That B12 Testing Is Appropriate
B12 test utilisation is appropriate. . . Illustrative quotes
1 . . .For specific populations and presentations “A number of [reasons for testing are] quite appropriate, like dementia, tiredness, and vegetarians, and alcohol
use” (Participant 4)
“testing [is] important in coeliac patients and other patients with malabsorption, so that’s the high risk patient”
(Participant 8)
2 . . .Because there are legitimate reasons
utilisation has grown
“There is much greater awareness in the community leading to B12 testing. There’s been some very interesting
papers recently, which they’re obviously reading . . . that have shown that if dementia and B12 are linked and
it’s treated within 2 years, it’s fully reversible . . . and if it’s not treated within 2 years it’s permanent”
(Participant 6)
“People are becoming a little bit more aware of screening for causes of cognitive decline” (Participant 9)
“We’ve got this increase in [the prescription of] Metformin for Type 2 diabetes and that has a significant impact on
the way B12 works” (Participant 9)
“I studied lacto-ovo vegetarians from 1972 to 2002 and there’s a direct correlation between a reduction in egg
and milk consumption [and a] reduction in serum B12 levels, and this was probably due to medical education
relating to cholesterol” (Participant 7)
“ there is [no longer] any ancillary testing and then you have to repeat your primary test to see if it is a different
result” (Participant 1)
3 . . .Because it is not driven by local interest “The growth [in B12 test utilisation] has been very similar [across] the states. . . .If you look at PSA [prostate
specific antigen testing] there are tenfold variations from one state to another in per capita usage. That tells me
[B12 testing is] not being driven by local interest, it’s being driven by a general medical issue . . . it’s not
something the laboratories are contributing to”
4 . . . Because we continue to find deficiencies “The relative incidence [of deficiency] hasn’t changed although the absolute numbers being identified, and
disease, obviously increases with the numbers that are requested” (Participant 1)
5 . . .Because we do not have better options I think we are using the wrong test . . . holotranscobalamin is actually a much better assay because it reflects the
fraction that goes directly inside the cells. (Participant 4)
“Just the mechanics with the holotranscobalamin assay, I mean most laboratories say we don’t do it because we
can’t afford it or we don’t have the machines to do it . . . It’s going to be one to two years before it’s available
to all laboratories so it’s a bit hard, we use what we can even though we’d like everyone to use active B12 in
practice” (Participant 8)
6a . . .Because it costs more (to the patient) to
restrict testing
“It seems like it [B12 testing] is money well spent when you compare it to the cost of inappropriately labelling
someone as being B12 deficient and a lifetime of injections they didn’t need” (Participant 9)
“I think the number, the dollars per low B12 may not be overspending public money. I think it can be very
significant to identify a single individual who’s B12 deficient . . . in terms of impact on your life and wellbeing”
(Participant 6)
6b . . .Because it costs more (to the system) to
restrict testing
“[When test restrictions are enacted, labs] spend heaps and heaps of money trying to work out which one they
can bill or not, and it might be more efficient for us just to do them all” (Participant 8)
“It might be more costly to do more. We want . . . to point out to the government all these costs of regulation so
every time . . . anybody imposes anything, there’s an additional cost” (Participant 2)
suggests an inevitable resistance to SR outcomes in this context.
Without unequivocal evidence of harm, inaccuracy or superior
alternatives it seems that review outcomes indicating support for
“refinements to indications” may always be susceptible to argu-
ments foregrounding the “burden of regulation.” This finding
indicates the importance of enhancing SR outcomes with eco-
nomic analyses at an early point in an engaged policy process in
order that discussion of the costs and benefits of disinvestment
options may remain appropriately evidence-based.
Evidence and Judgment
As indicated above, there was general agreement among pathol-
ogists that the holotranscobalamin assay (as yet not publicly
funded in Australia, nor widely available) represents a superior
B12 test than that currently used in most Australian laboratories.
Interestingly, the supposed superior accuracy of holotranscobal-
amin was not taken as evidence that disinvestment from the
current B12 item may be justified. On the contrary; partici-
pants argued that inaccuracy is inherent in all testing, an issue
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suggesting that decisions about what constitutes “appropriate
test utilization” rely, not on evidence such as that generated
from SR, but on “judgments” around sensitivity versus speci-
ficity, the value of screening, and the definition of reference
standards and ranges for deficiency; all questions of values.
Sensitivity Versus Specificity
Participant (P) 6: Even that test [holotranscobalamin], while
it’s a good test, the predictive value will be limited. You’ll still
have false positives and false negatives no matter what you do.
The Value of Screening
P9: The difference between therapeutics and diagnostics is ab-
solutely enormous . . . [In therapeutics] you can measure side
effects, efficacy and costs much more easily than in diagnostics,
where essentially we’re offering screening for disease and if
you’re doing your job properly most of the results are going to
be normal. It’s a philosophical question, how much investment
the community wants to make in screening.
The Definition of “Reference Standards” and “Reference Ranges”
P6: The whole study you [the research team] have done is
predicated on reference ranges and I know some people who
have used MCV [mean corpuscular volume] as the standard.
There’s no problem with B12 until the MCV is elevated. Well,
you miss 80 percent of all cases if that’s the reference standard
you’re using.
P2: In the case of B12, the problem is defining reference
ranges. It’s really very different depending on how you measure
it, and the link [from] the appropriate reference range to clinical
impact on the patient is really, the evidence around that is very
poor.
As these examples illustrate, the argument that decisions
around what constitutes appropriate testing are ultimately “judg-
ment calls” worked to contest the notion that disinvestment pol-
icy should be guided by SR evidence in cases where evidence of
effectiveness is deemed to be “complex”. In these extracts, the
criteria by which “appropriate testing” may be measured in evi-
dence are complicated by the claims that “all tests are fallible”,
and that investment in tests as “diagnostics” or as “screening”
represents a “philosophical” decision.
The final argument outlined above—that inconsistent refer-
ence ranges for deficiency cloud analysis of B12 test efficacy—
served as the most central claim against using a SR to guide
disinvestment in this area. The argument that you “cannot sys-
tematically review studies of B12 testing if reference ranges are
inconsistent” functioned, not only to undermine the outcomes
of the review presented, but to reframe the central problem and
corresponding disinvestment solutions.
Reframing the Terms of the Problem
The problem is inconsistent reference ranges, so the answer is more research. By
arguing that B12 test usage is not perfect, but “appropriate,” and
that any problems identified rest with inconsistent definitions
of deficiency, participants contested the terms of the problem
driving the SR. In turn, they contested the applicability of its
outcomes in framing future policy. While participants attested to
the value of systematic reviewing for disinvestment in the case of
pathology items whose reference ranges and clinical expression
are clear, they rejected the method in this more “complicated”
case.
P2: Where you have a test of a very reliable reference range
that everybody agrees on and is appropriately linked to the clin-
ical expression of the problem, yes, systematic review in the way
you’ve talked about is very reliable. In this situation the thing
that is complicating it is the confusion about what is the refer-
ence range of B12, so applying that tool to B12 measurement. . .
does not work because of the complexity around and the uncer-
tainty.
Reframing the problem as one of “reference range uncer-
tainty” (rather than “inappropriate usage” or an “ineffective
test”) served to position further primary research as an appropri-
ate next step within a disinvestment program. Significantly, the
argument that such research should be undertaken within lab-
oratories (rather than universities or government departments)
served both to position pathologists as the appropriate arbiters
of a disinvestment agenda and, potentially, to justify increased
expenditure in this area.
P2: One of the real concerns we have about where funding
is going for pathology . . . is it’s trying to strip away the pro-
fessional and scientific basis of this on the grounds that, saying
that this is a lousy test, just stop doing it, we’re not going to
fund these any more . . . and what that will do is take people like
the ones sitting around this table out of the process. . . .I would
say that it is not NHMRC research, it is appropriate continued
research in any professionally high standard, high quality prac-
tice that’s public or private . . . but it has to be recognized, the
importance of that to the Australian health economy [so] that
the pathology lab remuneration processes include a provision
for that activity to continue.
This argument is significant in that it supports a disin-
vestment path that, unlike systematic reviewing, rests upon
stakeholder-defined criteria of “quality” and “standards”.
The problem is folate, so we should “split the item” and “educate the doctors”. As out-
lined earlier, a second arm of participants’ arguments against
disinvestment from the combined B12/folate item number rested
upon the notion that only folate testing is “really a problem”
because mandatory fortification has significantly reduced the
identification of deficiency. This argument worked, at one level,
to offer an opportunity for disinvestment that pathologists de-
scribed as being legitimate and evidence-based.
P3: I think discrimination post fortification is probably the
issue, in terms of folate at least that it’s not really required any
more. . .
P1: I think it could boil down to that . . . we recognize that
with folate fortification, the scene has completely changed and I
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guess it’s really as simple as getting the IT systems in surgeries
to reflect that . . . if there’s a button they press which gives a
combined test, if that was de-linked it would be much more
sensible.
While offering a potentially useful disinvestment option,
this suggestion explicitly attributes responsibility for over-
expenditure on folate tests to the clinicians who request them
(not pathologists). This suggestion does not attend to the claim
(presented by one participant but roundly rejected by others)
that private laboratories may use the ambiguity inherent in the
combined B12/folate item number to test red cell folate (for
which the laboratory receives a rebate) rather than serum folate
(for which they are not paid).
P8: The only reason private labs do red cell folate is because
there’s a rebate for it. According to the wording of the item
number you do not get paid for serum folate. . .
Moreover, the depiction of folate testing as an appropriate
candidate for restriction on the grounds of fortification appears
to set a very high burden of proof for disinvestment in pathology.
P2: Maybe we are saying folate should not be done and B12
should be, unless you have [B12] fortified food.
Ultimately, pathologists’ reframing of the “B12/folate prob-
lem” as a problem of “folate alone” deflects attention from the
complexity of B12 testing. Instead, it makes way for a solution
that accords with pathologists’ own interpretation of appropriate
evidence for disinvestment.
DISCUSSION
Tests for B12 and folate are legacy items; if subjected to contem-
porary HTA processes as new or emerging “investment” items,
the evidence base is such that it is questionable as to whether
or not they would receive a favorable funding decision. This
research points to the added complexity inherent in “disinvest-
ment” decision making. Due to the distinct parallels between
investment and disinvestment decision making—focusing as
they both do on safety, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness—it
seems logical that disinvestment be situated within the HTA/SR
paradigm. The process outlined here makes explicit the central
role and contribution of SR to disinvestment discussions with
clinical stakeholders, in line with evidence-informed notions
of robust, defensible and sustainable health policy. However,
findings from this study suggest there are some limitations to
this approach, grounded primarily in stakeholder’s contest of
the evidence and its framing.
While an evidence-informed deliberative stakeholder en-
gagement may contribute unique solutions to a disinvestment
discussion that may not have been previously considered, there
are likely instances when a full SR may be of uncertain value
to disinvestment initiatives, including: when there is lack of
a contemporary evidence base reflecting current practice; re-
search questions that are more appropriately addressed using
existing population-based data sources (e.g., clinical registries);
genuine orphan procedures with no comparator technology; co-
dependent technologies; or when the salient questions relate to
how a technology is applied rather than the technology itself.
The manner in which these stakeholders re-framed this problem
as one of “reference ranges” or “folate alone post-fortification”
suggests the importance of involving stakeholders (particularly
clinical) in framing the review that seeks to inform a disin-
vestment question. Also, their input suggests that disinvestment
might look different in relation to different questions (in this
case primary research may be a necessary clarifier in a disin-
vestment program).
Additionally, the selection of the most appropriate synthe-
sis products may best be done in consultation with a range
of stakeholders, including clinicians, to ensure methods fit for
purpose. Multiple strategies for synthesizing an evidence-base
exist, including (but not limited to) SRs, meta-analyses, realist
synthesis (18) or rapid reviews. The appropriateness of each
“synthesis product” for informing policy varies based largely
upon the types of questions being asked of the evidence base:
how has this problem arisen; how does the magnitude of this
problem compare with other problems; what are the impacts of
an intervention across specific population sub-groups; what is
it about this intervention that makes it ineffective in this sit-
uation; or, how cost-effective are alternative policy or clinical
approaches (13)?
Common to each synthesis product ought to be the oppor-
tunity to articulate where gaps in knowledge exist and how they
might be addressed. The present analysis suggests that early,
broad-based engagement with clinical stakeholders may have
assisted in guiding the SR toward alternative gaps (e.g., refer-
ence range inconsistency), and identifying requisite primary re-
search processes for addressing them. However, HTA structures
in various countries may not have capacity to fill these identi-
fied research gaps. For example, funding may not be available to
carry out additional primary research to clarify reference range
uncertainty.
Within programs of investment/disinvestment, some juris-
dictions are beginning to move toward a more consultative ap-
proach of review co-development, working alongside sponsors
and stakeholders to create policy-pragmatic research. Australia
is trialing SR production based on a co-developed Decision
Analytic Protocol (DAP) between the review sponsor and the
Medical Services Advisory Committee (MSAC), which guides
the direction of a subsequent HTA incorporating a SR and eco-
nomic/financial modeling. While this might flag a research gap,
it does not fill it (though the review might shift in direction,
if feasible). Other approaches such as “coverage with evidence
development” or the “future research needs” program of the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality could contribute
important knowledge here.
While these co-produced approaches hold genuine appeal
for disinvestment programs, they need to be managed carefully.
Three key characteristics of disinvestment-focused initiatives
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pose challenges to this process. First, disinvestment risks con-
tinued perception that it is a negative, rationing approach, rather
than one espousing quality and safety. Second, co-developed
disinvestment reviews may be at risk of being redirected toward
ancillary issues, while neglecting critically important questions
related to technology effectiveness. Finally, information asym-
metry between clinically engaged experts and policy or decision
makers may preclude the truly collaborative, informed and tech-
nical discussions required to generate genuine change. Over-
coming these challenges will require innovative approaches to
co-produced evidence syntheses, broad-based stakeholder en-
gagements and a sustained commitment from clinicians and
policy makers alike.
A stakeholder-engaged co-produced disinvestment process
for building evidence synthesis products may need to consider
from the outset the terms of the review; what constitutes evi-
dence in this context; the advantages and disadvantages of dif-
ferent forms of evidence; and how a synthesis should be struc-
tured. Expectations on clinicians are high, as they are charged
with the responsibility of representing their patients, their pro-
fession and the population as a whole. It is, therefore, critical
to identify ways of supporting clinician partners in negotiating
these tensions.
CONCLUSION
While engaging vested stakeholders in processes such as this
poses significant challenges, if disinvestment is to remain fo-
cused on improving the quality and safety of health systems it
will continue to require clinical stakeholders to inform, guide,
and invest in change.
Systematic reviews and evidence syntheses are important
components of quality and safety, and for informing health pol-
icy decisions, including those related to disinvestment. Trends
toward co-development of SRs for informing investment deci-
sions suggest that there may be value in similar approaches for
informing disinvestment decisions, although avenues to fund
identified evidence-gaps will be required.
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